Abstract An authenticated encryption (AE) scheme simultaneously achieves two security goals: confidentiality and authenticity. AE can be divided into symmetric AE and asymmetrical (public key) AE. In a symmetric AE scheme, deniability is gained automatically. However, a public key AE scheme can not gain deniability automatically; on the contrary, it provides non-repudiation. In this paper, we address a question on deniability of public key AE. Of course, we can achieve this goal by "deniable authentication followed by encryption" method. However, such method has the following two weaknesses: (1) the computational cost and communication overhead are the sum of two cryptographic primitives; (2) it is complex to design cryptographic protocols with deniable authentication and confidentiality using two cryptographic primitives. To overcome the two weaknesses, we propose a new concept called deniable authenticated encryption (DAE) that can achieve both the functions of deniable authentication and public key encryption simultaneously, at a cost significantly lower than that required by the "deniable authentication followed by encryption" method. This single cryptographic primitive can simplify the design of cryptographic protocols with deniable authentication and confidentiality. In particular, we construct an identity-based deniable authenticated encryption (IBDAE) scheme. Our construction uses tag-key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) hybrid techniques, which is more practical for true applications. We show how to construct an IBDAE scheme using an identity-based deniable authenticated tag-KEM (IBDATK) and a DEM. We also propose an IBDATK scheme and prove its security in the random oracle model. For typical security level, our scheme is at least 50.7 and 22.7 % faster than two straightforward "deniable authentication followed by encryption" schemes, respectively. The communication overhead is respectively reduced at least 21.3 and 31.1 %. An application of IBDAE to an e-mail system is described.
Introduction
An authenticated encryption (AE) scheme simultaneously achieves two security goals: confidentiality and authenticity. AE can be divided into symmetric AE [1] and asymmetrical (public key) AE [2, 3] . A symmetric AE use a keyed hash (i.e, a MAC) with some appropriate key K 1 along with a secure encryption scheme with an independent key K 2 to achieve AE. In this model, we need agree K 1 and K 2 between the sender and the receiver in advance. The authenticity of symmetric AE is deniable authentication since both the sender and the receiver can generate the same ciphertext. That is, the receiver can generate a ciphertext that is indistinguishable from that generated by the sender. A public key AE integrates public key encryption and digital signature in a single procedure to reduce the computation and communication cost. A public key AE does not automatically achieve deniable authentication since only the sender can generate a valid ciphertext. That is, a public key AE scheme provides non-repudiation. Therefore, there is an important difference about authenticity between symmetric AE and public key AE. The symmetric AE is deniable and the public key AE is not deniable.
Motivation and contribution
In this paper, we address a question on deniability of public key AE. Of course, we can achieve this goal by "deniable authentication followed by encryption" method. However, such method has the following two weaknesses: (1) the computational cost and communication overhead are the sum of two cryptographic primitives; (2) it is complex to design cryptographic protocols with deniable authentication and confidentiality using two cryptographic primitives. In this paper, we propose a new concept called deniable authenticated encryption (DAE) that can achieve both the functions of deniable authentication and public key encryption simultaneously, at a cost significantly lower than that required by the "deniable authentication followed by encryption" method. This single cryptographic primitive can simplify the design of cryptographic protocols with deniable authentication and confidentiality. In particular, we construct an identity-based deniable authenticated encryption (IBDAE) scheme. Our construction uses tag-key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) hybrid techniques, which is more practical for true applications. We show how to construct an IBDAE scheme using an identity-based deniable authenticated tag-KEM (IBDATK) and a DEM. We also propose an IBDATK scheme and prove its security in the random oracle model. An application of IBDAE to an e-mail system is described.
Related work
Here we introduce four related notions, identity-based cryptography (IBC), hybrid encryption, and deniable authentication.
IBC is introduced by Shamir [4] in 1984. Compared with the public key infrastructure (PKI), the main advantage of the IBC is the elimination of public key certificates. In the IBC, a user's public key can be derived directly from its identity information, such as telephone numbers, e-mail addresses and IP addresses. The private key of the user is generated by a trusted third party called private key generator (PKG). Authenticity of the public key is explicitly verified without requiring an attached public key certificate. The IBC is very suitable for developing a secure e-mail system. When Alice hopes to send an e-mail to Bob at bob@uestc.edu.cn, she encrypts her message using the string "bob@uestc.edu.cn". In this process, Alice does not need to obtain Bob's public key certificate. When Bob receives the encrypted e-mail, he applies for a private key from the PKG and then decrypts his e-mail. Note that unlike the PKI-based e-mail systems, Alice can send an encrypted e-mail to Bob even if Bob has not obtained his key pair information. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [5] designed a practical identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme using bilinear pairings and proved its security in the random oracle model. Park and Lee [6] proposed another IBE scheme that achieves a tight security reduction to the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. In 2002, Hess [7] constructed an identity-based signature (IBS) whose security depends on the hardness of the DiffieHellman problem in the random oracle model. In 2003, Cha and Cheon [8] designed a new IBS using gap Diffie-Hellman groups. In 2011, Hsu and Lin [9, 10] extended AE into the identity-based environment and constructed identity-based authenticated encryption (IBAE). However, these two IBAE schemes have non-repudiation. That is, they are not deniable. Some identity-based signcryption (IBSC) [11] [12] [13] also were proposed to achieve both confidentiality and authentication. However, these IBSC schemes still have non-repudiation.
The practical way to perform secret communication for large messages is to use hybrid encryption. The hybrid encryption splits the encryption process into two parts: one part uses public key techniques to encrypt a one-time symmetric key; the other part uses the symmetric key to encrypt the actual message. In such a construction, the public key part is called key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and the symmetric key part is called data encapsulation mechanism (DEM). In 2003, Cramer and Shoup [14] first gave a formal analysis for the hybrid KEM-DEM construction. Then some efficient KEM-DEM constructions have been proposed [15] [16] [17] . The advantage of this paradigm is that it gives a clear separation between the various parts of the cipher allowing for modular design. In [15] , Abe et al. introduced tag-KEM that takes as input a tag in KEM. Note that the using of tag-KEM brings simpler scheme descriptions and better generic security reductions. Bentahar et al.'s [18] extended KEM into identity-based environment and proposed several efficient constructions of identity-based KEM. In 2014, Abdalla et al. [19] discussed the relation between the notions of verifiable random functions and identity-based KEM.
Deniable authentication is different to traditional authentication and has the following two main characteristics: (1) it enables an intended receiver to identify the source of a given message; (2) the intended receiver cannot prove the source of a given message to any third party. Deniable authentication can be used in many specialized applications. For example, it can provide freedom from coercion in electronic voting systems and secure negotiation over the Internet [20, 21] . In 2005, Shi and Li [22] extended deniable authentication into identity-based environment and designed an identity-based deniable authentication (IBDA) protocol. Kar [23] designed an IBDA protocol based on Diffie-Hellman problem assumption. However, Kar's protocol is interactive. An interactive protocol usually consumes more communication cost than a non-interactive protocol. In 2014, Li et al. [24] proposed a non-interactive IBDA protocol using bilinear pairings under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. In addition, their protocol supports batch verification that can speed up the verification of authenticators.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We define the formal model of IBDAE in Sect. 2. The IBDATK is given in Sect. 3. We show how to construct an IBDAE scheme using an IBDATK and a DEM in Sect. 4. An example of IBDATK is described in Sect. 5. We discuss the performance of our scheme in Sect. 6. A secure e-mail protocol based on IBDAE is designed in Sect. 7. Finally, the conclusions are given in Sect. 8.
IBDAE
In this section, we give the formal definition and security notions for IBDAE.
Syntax
A generic IBDAE scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
-Setup is a probabilistic algorithm run by a PKG that takes as input a security parameter k, and outputs a master secret key s and the system parameters param including a master public key P pub . Here we assume that param are public so that we do not need to include them in other algorithms. 
Security notions
An IBDAE scheme should satisfy confidentiality and deniable authentication. Here we give two games to capture the two security properties.
The standard adopted security notion for confidentiality is the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2). We apply this notion to our IBDAE. We consider the following game (Game-I) played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
-Initial C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends the system parameters param to A. -Phase 1 A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries (these queries may be made adaptively, i.e. each query may depend on the answer to the previous queries). Note that A is allowed to make a key extraction query on identity I D s in the Game-I. It ensures the forward security of the scheme, i.e. confidentiality is preserved in case the sender's private key becomes compromised.
For the deniable authentication, we adopt deniable authentication against adaptive chosen messages attack (DA-CMA) notion in [24] . We consider the following game (Game-II) played between a challenger C and an adversary F.
-Initial C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends the system parameters param to F. 
Note that F is not allowed to make a key extraction query on identity I D r in the Game-II. This condition is necessary to obtain the deniability property. The sender can deny its action since the receiver also can generate a valid ciphertext. This is the main difference between deniable authentication in DAE and undeniable authentication in digital signature.
IBDATK
In this section, we give the formal definition and security notions for identity-based deniable authenticated tag-KEM (IBDATK). IBDATK can be considered as an identity-based tag-KEM with deniable authentication property. IBDATK should provide two important security properties: confidentiality and deniable authentication.
Syntax
A generic IBDATK scheme consists of the following five algorithms.
-Setup is a probabilistic algorithm run by a PKG that takes as input a security parameter k, and outputs the system's parameters param, including a master public key P pub and a master secret key s. We also assume that param are public so that we do not need to include them in other algorithms. -Extract is a key extraction algorithm run by the PKG that takes as input an identity I D and the master secret key s, and outputs the corresponding private key S I D . The PKG transmits the private key to its owner in a secure way. -Sym is a probabilistic symmetric key generation algorithm run by a sender that takes as input a sender's private key S I D s and a receiver's identity I D r , and outputs a symmetric key K together with internal state information ω.
Here K ∈ K IBDATK is a key in the space of possible session keys at a given security level. K IBDATK is the key space. -Encap is a probabilistic key encapsulation algorithm which takes as input the state information ω and an arbitrary tag τ , and returns an encapsulation ψ ∈ E IBDATK . Here E IBDATK is the encapsulation space. -Decap is a deterministic decapsulation algorithm run by a receiver that takes as input an encapsulation ψ, a tag τ , a sender's identity I D s and a receiver's private key S I D r , and outputs the corresponding key K or a special symbol ⊥ indicating invalid encapsulation.
We make the consistency constraint that if
Security notions
An IBDATK scheme should satisfy confidentiality and deniable authentication. We give the formal security definition here. For the confidentiality, we consider the following game (Game-III) played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
-Initial C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends the system parameters param to A. -Phase 1 A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries (these queries may be made adaptively, i.e.
each query may depend on the answer to the previous queries). For deniable authentication, we consider the following game (Game-IV) played between a challenger C and an adversary F.
-Initial C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends the system parameters param to F. -Attack F performs a polynomially bounded number of queries just like in the Game-III.
and wins the game if the following conditions hold: 
A hybrid IBDAE scheme
We can combine an IBDATK scheme IBDATK with a DEM scheme DEM (the definition of DEM can be found in Appendix 1) to form a hybrid IBDAE scheme IBDAE. Our method is described in Fig. 1 . Note that the tag is the ciphertext output by the DEM. Such construction yields simpler scheme descriptions and better generic security reductions.
We give the security results for such construction in Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 1 Let IBDAE be a hybrid IBDAE scheme constructed from an IBDATK scheme IBDATK and a DEM scheme 
An efficient IBDATK scheme
In this section, we propose an efficient IBDATK scheme using bilinear pairings. We first describe the basic definition and properties of the bilinear pairings. The we give the IBDATK scheme and discuss its consistency, deniability and security.
Bilinear pairings
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a prime q, and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties:
Non-degeneracy There are P and Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = 1, where 1 is the identity element of group G 2 . 3. Computability There is an efficient algorithm to computê e(P, Q) for all P,Q ∈ G 1 .
The modified Weil pairing and the Tate pairing [5, 7, 8] are admissible maps of this kind. The security of our scheme described here relies on the hardness of the following problems.
Given two groups G 1 and G 2 of the same prime order q, a bilinear mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 and a generator P of G 1 , the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem in (G 1 , G 2 ,ê) is to decide whether θ =ê(P, P) abc or not given (P, a P, bP, cP) and an element θ ∈ G 2 . We define the advantage of an adversary C against the DBDH like this
Definition 5
The ( dbdh , t)-DBDH assumption holds if no t-polynomial time adversary C has advantage at least dbdh in solving the DBDH problem.
Given two groups G 1 and G 2 of the same prime order q, a bilinear mapê :
is to compute h =ê(P, P) abc given (P, a P, bP, cP).
Definition 6
The ( bdh , t)-BDH assumption holds if no tpolynomial time adversary C has advantage at least bdh in solving the BDH problem.
Our scheme
Our scheme consists of the following five algorithms.
-Setup Define G 1 , G 2 andê as in Sect. 5.1. Let H 1 , H 2 and H 3 be three hash functions where
Here n is the key length of a DEM and q ≥ 2 k , where k is a security parameter. Let P be a generator of G 1 . The PKG chooses a master secret key s ∈ Z * q randomly and computes P pub = s P. The PKG publishes system parameters 
-Encap Given the state information ω and an arbitrary tag τ , this algorithm works as follows.
-Decap Given an encapsulation ψ = (R, T ), a tag τ , a sender's identity I D s and a receiver's private key S I D r , this algorithm works as follows.
, otherwise output the symbol ⊥.
Consistency
The consistency of our scheme can be easily verified by the following equations.
x .
Deniability
The receiver with private key S I D r can generate an encapsulation that is indistinguishable from that generated by the sender with private key S I D s . To simulate the transcripts on a tag τ , the receiver performs the steps below.
ψ = (R,T ) generated by the receiver is indistinguishable from ψ = (R, T ) that is generated by the sender according to the Encap algorithm in Sect. 5.2. Let ψ = (R , T ) be an encapsulation that is randomly chosen in the set of all valid sender's encapsulation intended to receiver. The probability Pr[ψ = ψ ] is 1/(q − 1) becauseψ is generated from a randomly chosen valuex ∈ Z * q . Likewise, the probability Pr[ψ = ψ ] has the same value 1/(q − 1) because it is generated from x ∈ Z * q . That is, both distributions are the same. 
Security

Performance discussion
We compare major computational cost, communication overhead, and formal security of straightforward "deniable authentication followed by encryption" method with those Table 1 . For convenience, we use SL+BF to denote the straightforward method based on the deniable authentication in [22] and the encryption scheme in [5] and LXJ+BF to denote the straightforward method based on the deniable authentication in [24] and the encryption scheme in [5] . We denote by PM the point multiplication in G 1 , EC the exponentiation computation in G 2 and PC the pairing computation. The other operations are ignored in Table 1 since these operations take the most running time of the whole algorithm. |x| denotes the number of bits of x. From Table 1 , we find that our scheme has the least computational cost and communication overhead. In addition, our scheme has the formal security proof and the straightforward method has no such property. We give a quantitative analysis for the computational cost and communication overhead. We use PBC Type A pairing [25] in this analysis. The Type A pairing is constructed on the curve
for some prime p ≡ 3 mod 4, where the embedding degree is 2 and the order of G 1 is q. In this analysis, we use three kinds of parameters that represents 80-bit, 112-bit and 128-bit AES [26] key size security level, respectively. Table 2 gives the specification for different security level of this analysis. Figure 2 gives the implementation time of SL+BF, LXJ+BF and our scheme on ThinkPad T430s that is equipped with an Intel Core i5 3210M 2.5 GHz machine with 4G RAM. From Fig. 2 = 23.0 % faster than SL+BF and LXJ+BF, respectively. Now we consider the communication overhead. Note that for 80-bit, 112-bit and 128-bit security level, the corresponding output sizes of MAC are 160 bits, 224 bits and 256 bits, respectively. When we adopt the 80-bit security level, the size of p is 512 bits. So the size of an element in group G 1 is 1024 bits using an elliptic curve with 160 bits q. By standard compression technique [27] , the size of an element in group G 1 can be reduced to 65 bytes. The size of an element in G 2 is 1024 bits. So, the communication overhead of SL+BF, LXJ+BF and our scheme are 3|G 1 | + |Z * q | + |M AC| + 2|m| bits = 3 * 65 + 20 + 20 + |m|/4 bytes = 235 + |m|/4 bytes, 2|G 1 | + |G 2 | + 2|m| bits = 2 * 65 + 128 + |m|/4 bytes = 258 + |m|/4 bytes, and |G 1 | + |G 2 | + |m| bits = 65 + 128 + |m|/8 bytes = 193 + |m|/8 bytes, respectively. We can use the same method to compute the communication overhead at the 112-bit security level and 128-bit security level. We summarize the communication overhead at different security level in Fig. 3 . Compared with SL+BF and LXJ+BF, the communication overhead (here we assume that |m| = 1000 bits) of our scheme is respectively reduced by 
Application
In this section, we show an application of IBDEA to an e-mail system. A secure e-mail system should provides confidentiality and authentication. If we adopt "digital signature followed by encryption" method, the privacy of the sender may be infringed since the receiver can prove the source to any third party. The DAE solves this problem in a good way. Here we give a secure e-mail protocol using our IBDAE. This protocol consists of a sender, a receiver and mail servers and is described in Fig. 4 . In this protocol, the identities of the sender and receiver are e-mail addresses. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a hybrid IBDAE scheme that can achieve confidentiality and deniable authentication in a logical single step. Our construction is based on an IBDATK scheme and a DEM scheme. We proposed an IBDATK scheme using bilinear pairings and proved its security in the random oracle model. For typical security level, our scheme is at least 50.7 and 22.7 % faster than two straightforward "deniable authentication followed by encryption" schemes, respectively. The communication overhead is respectively reduced at least 21.3 and 31.1 %. A secure e-mail protocol based on IBDAE was designed.
-Enc is a deterministic encryption algorithm that takes as input a security parameter k, a key K and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1} * , where K ∈ K DEM is a key in the given key space, and m is a bit string of arbitrary length. We denote this as c = Enc(K , m). -Dec is a deterministic decryption algorithm that takes as input a key K and a ciphertext c, and outputs the message m ∈ {0, 1} * or a symbol ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext is invalid.
In this paper, we only require that a DEM is secure with respect to indistinguishability against passive attackers (IND-PA). Formally, this security notion is captured by the following game played between an adversary A and a challenger C.
-Initial A runs on input k and submits two equal length messages, m 0 and m 1 . -Challenge C selects a random key K ∈ K DEM and a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and sends c = Enc(K , m β ) to A as a challenge ciphertext. -Guess A outputs a bit β and wins the game if β = β.
The advantage of A is defined to be Adv(A) = |2Pr[β = β] − 1|, where Pr[β = β] is the probability that β = β.
Definition 7
An adversary A is said to be an ( dem , t)-attacker of a DEM scheme if A has advantage at least dem in the above game, runs in time at most t. A DEM scheme is said to be ( dem , t)-IND-PA secure if no ( dem , t)-attacker exists.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof Our proof method is as follows. We define a sequence Game 0 , Game 1 , Game 2 of modified attack games. The only difference between games is how the environment responds to A's oracle queries.
Let σ * = (ψ * , c * ) be the challenge ciphertext submitted to A by its challenge oracle that encrypts either m 0 or m 1 according to a bit β. Let K * denote the symmetric key used by the challenge oracle in the generation of the challenge ciphertext, or alternatively, the decapsulation of ψ * using the identities I D s and I D r that are chosen by the adversary. For any i = 0, 1, 2, we let S i be the event that δ = δ in game Game i , where δ is the bit chosen by A's challenge oracle and δ is the bit output by A. This probability is taken over the random choices of A and those of A's oracles.
We will use the following useful lemma from [28] .
Lemma 1 ([28]) Let E, E , and F be events defined on a probability space such that Pr[E ∧ ¬F] = Pr[E ∧ ¬F].
Then we have
Game 0 : We simulate the view of the adversary in a real attack by running the key extraction algorithm and using the resulting keys to respond to A's queries. So the view of A is the same as it would be in a real attack. Therefore, we have Obviously this change has no impact on the adversary and so
Game 2 : In this game, we modify Game 1 by replacing K * with a random key K from K DEM . The result then follows from the following Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 2
There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm C 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that
Proof In this proof, we show how to construct an adversary C 1 of the IBDATK to violate the assumed security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
-Initial Given the system parameters param, C 1 sends it to A. -Phase 1 When A makes a key extraction query on identity I D, C 1 makes a key extraction query to its own key extraction oracle and forwards the answer to A. When A makes an encryption query with a plaintext m, a sender's identity I D i and a receiver's identity I D j , C 1 follows the steps below.
1. Make a symmetric key generation query on (I D i , I D j ) to its own symmetric key generation oracle to obtain K . 2. Compute c = DEM.Enc (K , m) . 3. Make a key encapsulation query on c to its own key encapsulation oracle to obtain ψ.
Return the ciphertext σ = (ψ, c) to A.
When A makes a decryption query with a ciphertext σ = (ψ, c), a sender's identity I D i and a receiver's identity I D j , C 1 follows the steps below.
Make a key decapsulation query on (ψ, c, I D i , I D j )
to its own key decapsulation oracle to obtain K . -Phase 2 A can ask a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively again as in phase 1 with the restriction that it cannot make a key extraction query on I D r and it cannot make a decryption query on σ * = (ψ * , c * ) to obtain the corresponding plaintext.
cating K β is the real key; otherwise it outputs β = 0 indicating K β is a random key.
When K β is the real key, A is run exactly as it would be run in Game 1 . This means that
When K β is the random key, A is run exactly as it would be in Game 2 . This means that
From the definition of security for IBDATK, we have
So the result holds.
Lemma 3
There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm C 2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that
Proof To construct such a C 2 we simply run A as it would be run in game Game 2 . We run the key extraction step so we can respond to A's queries before it calls its challenge encryption oracle. When A calls its challenge encryption oracle with two messages m 0 and m 1 , a sender's identity I D s and a receiver's identity I D r , we simply relay m 0 and m 1 to the challenge encryption oracle of C 2 to obtain c * .
We then make a symmetric key generation query and a key encapsulation query to obtain K * and ψ * , respectively. We discard K * and return σ * = (ψ * , c * ) to A. In this simulation A is run by C 2 in exactly the same manner as the former would be run in game Game 2 ; moreover, Pr[S 2 ] corresponds exactly to the probability that C 2 correctly determines the hidden bit of its challenge encryption oracle since C 2 outputs whatever A outputs. The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof Suppose that F is an adversary who can breaks the DA-CMA security of the IBDAE scheme with advantage dae . We can use this to construct another algorithm C that can break the DA-CMA security of the IBDATK with advantage at least datk too. C runs as follow.
-Initial Given the system parameters param, C sends it to F. -Attack When F makes a key extraction query on identity I D, C makes a key extraction query to its own key extraction oracle and forwards the answer to F. When F makes an encryption query with a plaintext m, a sender's identity I D i and a receiver's identity I D j , C follows the steps below. Obviously, this simulation is perfect. If F wins the DA-CMA game for the IBDAE, C have the same probability to win the DA-CMA game for the IBDATK.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof C receives a random instance (P, a P, bP, cP, θ) of the DBDH problem and attempts to decide whether θ = e(P, P) abc or not. C will run A as a subroutine and play A's challenger in Definition 3. A will consult C for answers to the random oracles H 1 , H 2 and H 3 . Roughly speaking, these answers are randomly generated, but to maintain the consistency and to avoid collision. C keeps three lists L 1 , L 2 and L 3 respectively to store the answers. The following assumptions are made.
1. A will ask for H 1 (I D) before I D is used in any key extraction queries, symmetric key generation queries, key encapsulation queries and key decapsulation queries. 2. An encapsulation returned from a key encapsulation query will not be used by A in a key decapsulation query. 3. The sender's identity and the receiver's identity are different in Encap and Decap algorithms. This assumption is called irreflexivity assumption in [11] . Such an assumption makes our proof simple.
-Initial C gives A the system parameters with P pub = cP. Note that c is unknown to C. This value simulates the master secret key for the PKG. -Phase 1 A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries.
-H 1 queries C first selects a number λ ∈{1, 2, . . . , q H 1 } randomly. A asks a polynomially bounded number of H 1 queries on identities of its choice. At the λ-th H 1 query, C answers by
-H 2 and H 3 queries When A asks queries on these hash values, C checks the corresponding list. If an entry for the query is found, the same answer will be given to A; otherwise, a randomly chosen value will be used as the answer to A. The query and answer will then be inserted in the list. C first chooses T * ∈ G 2 , sets R * = a P and computes z * = T * /θ (where θ is C's candidate for the DBDH problem). Then C runs the H 2 simulation algorithm to find K 1 = H 2 (z * ). C chooses K 0 ∈ K IBDATK and a bit β ∈ {0, 1} randomly, and sends K β to A. A then sends a tag τ * to C. Finally, C gives the encapsulation ψ * = (R * , T * ) to A. -Phase 2 A can ask a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively again as in phase 1 with the restriction that it cannot make a key extraction query on I D r and cannot make a decapsulation query on (ψ * , τ * ) to obtain the corresponding key. -Guess A outputs a bit β for which it believes the relation (K β , ω * ) = Sym(S I D s , I D r ) and ψ * = Encap(ω * , τ * ) hold. At this moment, if β = β, C returns 1 that denotes θ =ê(P, P) abc ; otherwise, it returns 0 that denotes θ = e(P, P) abc .
We now assess C's probability of success. Note that C only fails in providing a consistent simulation because one of the following independent events: The bound on C's computation time comes from the fact that C needs O(q s + q e + q d ) pairing operations in the symmetric key generation queries, key encapsulation queries and key decapsulation queries.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof Here we use the forking lemma [29] to prove the security of our scheme. To use the forking lemma, we need to show how our scheme fits into the signature scheme described in [29] , the simulation step in which the signature can be simulated without the sender's private key (and thus, also without the master secret key), and how we can solve BDH problem based on the forgery. First, we observe that our scheme satisfies the requirement described in [29] . During the encapsulation of a tag τ , the tuple (σ 1 , u, σ 2 ) is generated that corresponds to the required three-phase honest-verifier zero-knowledge identification protocol, where σ 1 = z is the commitment of the prover, u = H 3 (τ, z) is the hash value depending on τ and σ 1 substituted for the verifier's challenge, and σ 2 = T is the response of the prover that relies on σ 1 , u and the sender's private key S I D s .
Next, we need to show a simulation step that supplies a faithful simulation to the forger F and how to solve the BDH problem by interacting with F. C receives a random instance (P, a P, bP, cP) of the BDH problem and is required to compute h =ê(P, P) abc . C will run F as a subroutine and plays F's challenger in the game of Definition 4. We describe this process as follows.
-Initial C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends the system parameters with P pub = cP to F. where ψ * = (R * , T * ). We coalesce the identities I D λ = {I D χ , I D ξ } and the tag τ * into a "generalized" forged tag (I D λ , τ * ) so as to hide the identity-based aspect of the DA-CMA attack, and simulate the setting of an identityless adaptive-CMA existential forgery for which the forking lemma is proven. From the the forking lemma [29] , if F is a sufficiently efficient forger in the above interaction, then we can construct a Las Vegas machine F that outputs two signed tags ((I D λ , τ * ), u * , ψ * ) and ((I D λ , τ * ),ū * ,ψ * ) with u * =ū * and the same commitment z * . To solve the BDH problem based on the machine F derived from F, we construct a machine C as follows. 2. C computesê(P, P) abc as (T * /T * ) 1/(u * −ū * ) .
From the forking lemma [29] and the lemma on the relationship between given-identity attack and chosen-identity attack [8] , if F succeeds in time t with probability ≥ 5(q e + 1)(q e + q H 3 )q H 1 /(2 k − 1), then C can solve the BDH problem in expected time t ≤ 60343q H 3 q H 1 2 k t/ (2 k − 1). Note that the coefficient is changed because the simulator should choose two different identities in advance.
